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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the economic and legal aspects of 
the involvement of privately owned vessels from the 
Chesapeake Bay region in maritime warfare from their first 
use through the Revolution.
The goals of the nation-state in instituting 
privateering are outlined and military, social, and economic 
goals are shown to be interrelated.
The blurred distinction between piracy and privateering 
is viewed as a result of the amount of the prize-ship's 
value claimed by the government as court fees and royal 
droit.
Examples of privateers and prizes through the Seven 
Years' War are given, illustrating the cyclical nature of 
privateering during a conflict. American resources on the 
eve of the Revolution, including the types of vessels used 
in privateering, are discussed.
The average values of recorded prizes taken by 
Chesapeake privateers during the American Revolution and the 
division of prize money among crews are combined and 
compared to merchant seamen's wages. Given a successful 
voyage, privateering held a three-to-one economic advantage 
for the common sailor over merchant service. Relative risks 
of the professions are weighed with little to choose between 
the two.
The regulation of privateering is traced from the 
earliest English admiralty courts, through the colonial 
vice-admiralty system. Conflicts between non-jury admiralty 
law and English common law led ultimately/to colonial 
grievances concerning abridgement of right to jury trial.
J
American efforts during the Revolution to redress this 
situation by using juries in admiralty prize cases proved 
abortive. Eventually, all American admiralty courts 
reverted to non-jury trials. The first federal court was 
convened to try interstate prize cases and admiralty 
appeals.
iv
PRIVATEERING IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE
INTRODUCTION
Privateering developed as a means for nation-states to 
fulfill three interrelated goals. The legitimization of 
piracy through state regulation was intended to: 1) co-opt
pirates who were indiscriminately draining national 
economies for individual gain, 2) provide a cheap means to 
deplete an enemy's maritime wealth, and 3) increase national 
wealth through a governmental claim to a share of the value 
of captured commerce. The common factor tying the three 
goals together was economic. From the simple sailor to 
state policy-makers, economic considerations were the 
driving forces behind privateering. Unfortunately, the 
economic advantages could only be realized during a period 
of formal armed conflict. While the second goal became 
irrelevant in peacetime, the first and third were 
continually active factors in policy formation and would 
often weigh in declarations of war.
The destruction of commercial shipping was second 
nature to American seamen by the time of the Revolution 
because of the long tradition of privateering in the New 
World. The granting of "letters of marque and reprisal," 
which commissioned privately-owned ships to prey upon 
vessels and property of an enemy state, had been used since 
the days of Drake. During the American Revolution it was
2
3the predominant manifestation of colonial sea power, having 
a far greater impact on British shipping than the few ships 
of Paul Jones's Continental navy.
While never as prevalent as in New England, 
privateering in the Chesapeake was extremely important to 
the economy of that maritime region. When virtually all 
other forms of economic stimulus were cut off by blockade, 
privateering became the one investment available to 
Chesapeake merchants. It was also the only source of 
employment for the mariners of the region. This group (and 
the social effects of privateering) cannot be separated from 
society as a whole because many landsmen were attracted to 
the sea for the first time as privateers. The political, 
economic, and social forces drawing these men into the 
dangers of the profession can be approached through the 
questions of who became privateers and why they did so. The 
answers provide a clearer picture of the social context in 
which they lived.
Beyond the military, social, and economic effects of 
privateering, important legal issues include international 
law and the role of commerce destruction in the escalation 
of disputes into outright warfare, admiralty law (which 
determined the distribution of prize vessels and goods), and 
constitutional law. The latter involved a debate over the 
sovereignty of the State of Virginia in the taxation of 
prizes and the creation of the first federal court of 
appeals to review admiralty cases.
CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATEERING
Considering the impact of privateering on the 
eighteenth-century Chesapeake, it is not particularly well 
studied. At least one of the reasons for this is the 
understandable confusion between piracy and privateering. 
While privateers were subject to regulations concerning the 
nationality and type of vessel they could take and the 
admiralty court's condemnation of the capture as a legal 
prize, it was common for these legalities to be ignored, 
especially at the end of a war when increased piracy 
accompanied the legal termination of privateering. Instead 
of returning to life on land or as merchant seamen, many 
privateers whose livelihood had been taken away by peace 
crossed the fine line into piracy, attacking vessels 
regardless of nationality.^
The famous case of Captain Kidd illustrates the 
confusion. He sailed from Plymouth, England in 1696 with a 
letter of marque, one-tenth of his profits to go to the 
crown. Evidently, he considered this too large a cut, for 
he cruised the Indian Ocean for the next three years 
plundering the vessels of any nation. His subsequent 
capture in Boston and trial and execution in England will 
forever blur the distinction between piracy and
4
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2privateering. Kidd notwithstanding, the vast majority of 
privateers did not become pirates and obeyed all 
regulations.^
One of the motivations toward piracy was the high 
percentage of the value of privateers' prizes which went to 
the officers of the courts. As of 1708 the judge's fee was 
7 percent, the advocate general's 5 percent, the marshal 
took 1.5 percent, and the appraiser and vendue master each 
received 2.5 percent. Some courts began remitting fees when 
they recognized that inflated court costs were increasing 
the temptation to turn pirate or to send prizes to less
4. 4expensive courts.
The primary reason for a lack of privateers or for 
those commissioned to turn pirate was the share of a prize 
claimed by the crown. The beginning of each conflict 
required the renewal or modification of the droit 
legislation. Before 1702 the royal droit was one-tenth the 
value of the prize. In 170 2 a need for more revenue or a 
decision that privateers were not needed in great numbers 
led to the droit's being raised to one-fifth. Likewise in 
1705 it was raised to one-third. Including customs duties 
and court charges, the government's share could total as 
much as 60 percent of the value of the prize.
In 1708, with Queen Anne's War, the droit was waived 
completely. The total prize value to be divided between the 
owners, captain, and crew of a privateer was thus 
immediately increased by one-half. With Keynesian logic,
6the third economic goal of increasing the national wealth 
was forsaken in favor of the second, that of depleting the 
enemy's wealth, as the incentive to fit out vessels as 
privateers and to actually deliver any prizes to an
g
admiralty court was strengthened. By 1715 the excessive 
court costs were addressed by royal instructions sent to 
Virginia which limited the charges levied by the officers of
7
the colony's admiralty courts to ten pounds per prize.
On August 20, 1739, on the eve of King George's War, 
William Byrd II wrote to Sir Robert Walpole urging the crown 
to again waive its droit. He also argued against the 
reestablishment of a Prize Office, citing the "exorbitant 
fees" charged by the "Vultures which hovered for prey about 
the Office" during the reign of King William. Byrd then 
charged some politicians with being apprehensive about the 
encouragement of privateering against Spain lest they bring 
the French "upon our backs." Byrd hoped that this would 
happen, because "if they do not, their Privateers both in 
Europe, and America will take Spanish Commissions, & so 
annoy our commerce as much, as if we were in actual War with 
them." He ended his correspondence with the exhortation to
g
"trust altogether to our Wooden Walls." Accordingly,
Parliament enacted legislation in 1740 that waived the droit
except for the normal customs and duties and the fees of the
9judges and officers of the prize courts. From King 
George's War through the Revolution the total cost of 
disposing of a prize was about 10 percent of its value.^
7At the time Byrd was writing, the activities of the
privateers themselves were increasing international tension
to the point of war. In 1739 the Spanish refused to
reimburse the British £95,000 for vessels "unjustly seized."
Governor William Gooch of Virginia was therefore authorized
to grant commissions of marque and reprisal against the
Spanish in the West Indies.^ On June 10, 1741 the Virginia
Council authorized the impressment of two vessels to be
outfitted as private sloops of war to defend the colony from
Spanish privateers rumored to be in the area. These
colony-sponsored privateers were to be commissioned for
three months and to carry sixty-to-seventy men each. The
sailors were to be paid forty shillings per month and the
owners of the vessels compensated at the rate of fourteen
12shillings per ton burthen per month.
On September 26, 1745 the Virginia Gazette carried an
advertisement announcing the completion in Norfolk of the
Earl of Stair, a snow privateer of 150 tons burthen, with
eighteen carriage and thirty swivel guns (large
blunderbuss-type weapons mounted in swivels on the bulwarks
and mast tops and used against the enemy crew at short
13range), and a crew of 150. It is significant that this 
was a new vessel built as a privateer, while the vast 
majority of such vessels were modified merchantmen.
In the same year a French prize, the Elizabeth, was 
condemned by the admiralty court in Williamsburg. Her cargo 
included 282 hogsheads of sugar, 4,000-5,000 weight of
8indigo and a parcel of choice mahogany planks. The prize
money was shared by two privateers who were sailing in
consort, for any vessel within sight of the prize at the
time of its capture was entitled to a share under admiralty 
14law. Presumably, even the appearance of another vessel
over the horizon would influence the surrender of the prize.
One of the responsibilities of the prize court was to
determine the percentage of influence and the corresponding
share due each vessel.
Also in 1745, American privateers were beginning to
cruise the waters of the West Indies and to send their
prizes into ports there. A Spanish ship worth £100,000 was
sent to Jamaica, and a Swedish ship carrying 300,000 pieces
of eight was taken by the privateer sloop Henry and sent to
15Barbados in that year. The use of the West Indies as a
rich cruising territory became almost as important as during
the American Revolution, when prizes were sent to French and
Dutch ports there.
In April 1745 the privateer Raleigh sent a French prize
valued at £5,000 into St. Kitt's.^ However, a possible
drop in the profitability of privateering toward the end of
King George's War is suggested by the advertisement for sale
17of both Raleigh and Earl of Stair m  August, 1746. Also,
only one prize appears in the Virginia Gazette after 
181745. As enemy merchant shipping was captured in the 
first months of war, insurance costs would rise and 
merchants would be more reluctant to send their ships to
9sea. It seems likely, then, that the number of possible
prize ships dropped off considerably after the first year of
war and subsequent privateering cruises took fewer prizes
19and were less profitable.
Prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years' War the
presence of privateers again strained international
relations. In 1755 a letter from London, reprinted in the
Virginia Gazette, claimed that French privateers would be
met by the same from England and that such proceedings might
be looked upon as open hostilities, occasioning a "Rupture
20between the principal Powers." The rupture occurred, but
French privateers were met with few from the Chaespeake
during the Seven Years' War. Prizes are scarcely mentioned
in the Gazette for 1756-63. One privateer was advertised as
fitting out for sea in the summer of 1756. Four prizes were
listed, three taken in 1757, quite early in the war; the
fourth details a second distribution of prize money in 1766,
21the capture date is not given.
This dearth of prizes notwithstanding, by the eve of the
Revolution the Americans had the experience and resources
necessary to mount a successful privateering campaign.
One-third of all vessels in British trade at the time were
American-built. The same proportion of British seamen were
American, many of whom had seen action on colonial
22privateers or naval vessels.
A few privateers were built for the job. Most, 
however, were hastily converted from merchant ships to
10
capitalize on the opportunity for a different kind of
profit. Colonial merchant vessels were particularly
well-suited to such conversion. The avoidance of British
duties through smuggling was widespread before the
Revolution. While smuggling honed American seamanship
skills useful in privateering, American shipbuilders began
to sacrifice cargo capacity for the speed needed to outrun
the revenue cutters. American merchant vessel hulls were
V-shaped rather than the traditional U-shape, and carried
23oversized masts to carry extra sails.
Chesapeake shipyards had built 12.5 percent of the
24total tonnage of shipping m  the colonies by 1769. Among 
these were found the types of vessels most useful and 
successful in privateering. Between 1756 and 1775 386
vessels were built in Maryland. Schooners represented the 
largest group of these - 111. There were 98 ship-rigged 
vessels, 74 sloops, 66 brigs, and 37 snows. The Virginia 
Gazette carried advertisements for 100 Virginia-built 
vessels between 1736 and 1766. Of these, 38 were sloops, 24
were brigs, 20 were schooners, 12 were snows, and 6 were
. . 25ships.
A ship was a three-masted, square-rigged vessel up to 
250 tons burthen, carrying up to 100 hands. It was not the 
most desirable vessel because its square-rig required too 
many crewmen to handle and it was not as nimble as a 
fore-and-aft rig. An example was the Buckskin, out of 
Maryland, with a crew of 100 and twenty-eight carriage guns,
11
making her the largest privateer out of that colony.
The brig was a smaller two-masted vessel of square rig,
eighty of which were commissioned as privateers by Virginia
and Maryland. An example is the Sturdy Beggar with a crew
of 80 and fourteen guns. A popular variant was the
brigantine, which had a gaff-rigged fore-and-aft mainsail
replacing the brig's square mainsail. Virginia and Maryland
also commissioned eighty brigantines during the Revolution.
The snow was a small brig with a trysail mast behind
the mainmast. It was not a particularly popular vessel. A
sloop was a small single-masted vessel, handy and shallow of
draft with a removable centerboard, it was popular for
evading heavier enemy ships in the shallow waters of the
Bay. The Baltimore Hero sloop was just fifty tons 
2 6burthen. Small galleys, barges, and whaleboats, known as
"spider chasers" were used in the more protected waters of
the Bay and its tributaries. These could carry a light
carriage gun as well as swivels in the bow, and often four
or five boats would work in consort to take an anchored ship
27of larger size.
The most popular type of vessel among Chesapeake
privateers was the topsail schooner; 40 percent of Maryland
28commissions were for this type of ship. Fore-and-aft 
rigged on both masts, the schooner's sails could be trimmed 
from the deck, and she could sail closer to the wind than 
any square-rigger. The schooner thus needed to make fewer 
tacks when sailing to windward, and she had the agility to
12
come about quickly when the tack was made. These qualities,
plus the ability to set a square main-topsail for additional
speed when running before the wind, often meant the
difference between a prize-winning cruise and coming home
empty-handed. The schooner Harlequin, with only six swivel
and no carriage guns and a crew of just twenty-one, was able
29to take a £20,000 prize m  December 1776. The topsail
schooner was the immediate ancestor of the Baltimore
Clipper, famous for its speed as a merchant vessel. The
average crew size for a topsail schooner privateer in the
30mid-eighteenth century was fifty-four.
The division of prize money among the crew was made 
according to an agreement signed by the owners, captain, and 
each crew member. The percentage retained by the owners 
varied from one-third to one-half of the proceeds, depending 
on whether or not seaman were in demand and whether the 
owners provisioned the vessel at their own expense rather 
than on credit to be paid out of the prize funds. A 
surviving crew agreement of 1762 for the privateer Mars 
provides that one-half of the prize money was to go to the 
owners, for they completely provisioned the ship. The rest 
was divided into shares as follows: the captain received
six full shares; the lieutenants and master, three shares 
each; captain's clerk, mates, steward, prize-master, gunner, 
boatswain, carpenter, and cooper, two shares each; gunner’s 
mate, boatswain's mate, doctor's mate, carpenter's mate, and 
cooper's mate, one and one-half shares each. The doctor
13
received three shares plus an allowance to keep the medicine
chest filled. The remainder of the crew received one share
each. Provision was made for the shares of any man killed
to be paid to his executors, and those who lost a limb were
entitled to the equivalent of 600 pieces-of-eight at six
shillings each before the division of the prize money. A
bonus of 40 pieces-of-eight was won by the crewman who first
31sighted a vessel later taken as prize.
For the common seaman, then, the motivation toward
privateering was strongly, though not completely, economic.
His chances for profit rode solely on finding and capturing
prizes, but his risk involved not merely his livelihood but
his life and limbs. The chances that a privateering voyage
was successful appear good. Between two and three thousand
American privateers are estimated to have sailed during the 
32Revolution. The records of the Virginia admiralty courts
were burned, but trial libels published in six other states
33list over twenty-one hundred prizes. Not all privateers
were as successful as the Enterprise of Baltimore which had
taken a total of eight prizes by the end of 1776, or the
Marquis Lafayette which took a single prize worth $350,000 
34m  1781. Some were taken by the Royal Navy or run
aground, some fought pitched battles with British or Tory
privateers, or returned empty-handed, but the aspiring
privateersman could reasonably expect to share in at least 
35one prize.
The Virginia Gazette cites fifty-one prizes taken by
14
Virginia and Maryland privateers during the Revolution. Of
these, thirteen were valued by estimate or by the actual
sale price of the condemned vessel and cargo. The values
range between £2400 and £100,000, with an average prize
value of £21,600. These figures do not, of course, take
into account prizes taken by Chesapeake privateers and sent
into ports in other colonies. While it is presumed that
prizes would, if possible, be sent into the home port for
condemnation, this was not possible when the British fleet
closed the Bay. Also, the French West Indies ports were
"crowded with cruisers and merchantmen belonging to these
states," and American prize agents sold many condemned 
36vessels there. Given the incompleteness of the data,
then, the total value of the fifty-one prizes at just over
£1,100,000 is a conservative estimate.
Following the Mars agreement and taking the average
prize value of £21,600, the owners and crew would each share
£9,720 (allowing for 10 percent court costs). Division of
the prize money among a fifty-four-man topsail schooner crew
would require seventy-nine shares, each of which would be
valued at about £123.
At the time of the American Revolution an able seaman
could make five pounds per month and an experienced mate
37seven pounds m  a merchantman. Over a seven-month period,
the average length of a cruise, a common privateer would
have made three and one-half times the pay of a merchant 
3 8sailor. Balanced against this is the estimate that
15
one-half of all those actively engaged in privateering were
39killed, injured, or captured.
The life of a privateer was not much more hazardous
than a merchant seaman's, however, for merchantmen were also
shot at and captured. In fact, privateers took pains to
avoid situations which might lead to casualties. Privateers
avoided gun duels because their great advantage in capturing
an enemy vessel was not their cannon, which could badly
damage a valuable prize. They carried lighter cannon than a
warship of comparable size because they tended to be broad
in the beam. Warships were built narrower in the beam at
the gun deck level to keep the weight of the heavy guns
centered. The typical Chesapeake-built ship had the low
freeboard used in calm southern seas; a very heavy weight of
guns run out to leeward in a strong wind would have likely
driven the ports under. A privateer was topheavy in spars
already and, in any case, her light timbers would not have
40stood the recoil from heavy cannon.
Capturing a prize by fouling and boarding was not 
favored by privateers either. Boarding was a dangerous 
procedure in the calmest of seas, collisions were 
uncontrollable and spars and rigging (the bread and butter 
of the privateer) could be fouled and lost. It was not the 
business of the privateersman to get himself killed in a 
heroic charge across blood-spattered decks. Rather, the 
privateer used his superior manpower to wear down his 
opponent in a long chase and overawe him with a few
16
well-placed near-misses into lowering his flag. Merchantmen
were notoriously short-handed; owners were loath to pay for
more than the minimum eight crewmen per mast necessary to
sail a square-rigged vessel. Thus, the privateer crew
generally held a five-or-six-to-one advantage over their 
41adversaries. Merchant crews, exhausted by the constant 
hard work of a long passage, would have been hard-pressed to 
work a defensive gun or two and to continue to sail the 
ship.
Large crews made for light work aboard privateers, and
the fact that only a fraction of the crew was needed to work
the rigging and sails led the Continental Congress to spread
the wealth among non-seamen by requiring that one-third of
42all crewmen be landsmen with no seagoing experience.
Apparently, the fresh air of a sea voyage, coupled with
financial opportunity, was too good to pass up. Virginia
soon had to enact legislation forbidding the distribution of
prize money by admiralty courts to privateers whose crew
included known deserters from the state or Continental
43armies, charging the owners a £500 fine.
In October 1775 Silas Deane, the American 
representative in Paris, succinctly stated the economic 
basis of privateering: "At least Ten Thousand Seamen are
thrown out of employ... these with their owners...cannot 
possibly long rest easy...their ships rotting and their 
Families starving...they will pursue the only method in 
their power of indemnifying themselves, and Reprisals will
17
44be made." This establishes the growth of privateering as
primarily defensive in nature, a reaction to the loss of
other means of survival. The capitalist impulse to reap
windfall profits was balanced by high risk.
Because the Chesapeake was so easily blockaded, the
45region's shipping was reduced by 75 percent by 1777. By
1779 the merchants of Baltimore decided to lay up all of
46their vessels due to British privateers. A picture
emerges of the large fleets of merchantmen sitting at
anchor, unable to move their goods, until some owners
realized that the only way to save their investments was to
outfit them as privateers. Not only were the ships idle,
but the capital to fit them out and the sailors to man them
were also. A letter from a citizen of the British trade
port of Liverpool reprinted in the February 26, 1779
Virginia Gazette illustrates the case. After claiming a
clear profit of £3,000 for each owner of the forty-seven
privateers sent out by the city, he wrote: "The
privateering trade is the best trade going on at this time,
for we have but little other. Half the people must have
been bankrupt, had it not been for the great success our
47armed ships have met with. " One month later, the total
profits of Liverpool's privateers (then numbered at
4Rfifty-seven) was put at £1,200,000 sterling.
The growth of privateering was probably cyclical during 
any conflict. The vast majority of prize citations in the 
Virginia Gazette are for the year 1776, when British
18
merchant shipping was most vulnerable. After suffering
large losses, British merchants would have laid up their
vessels as Baltimore's did and eventually turned to
privateering themselves. Thus, the boom in Liverpool
privateering occurred in 1779. By September of that year,
however, a British army official was quoted as saying that
privateering from the British islands was almost at an 
49end. That this was true was due more to the lack of
potential American prizes than to an effective American
naval defense. Military circumstances did have an effect on
economic cycles, however. Chesapeake privateering ceased
during the British fleet's stay, but revived at a reduced
50level with the arrival of the French.
It appears that the total profits of Chesapeake and
Liverpool privateers cancel each other out, and indeed this
was probably true of the total profits of the privateers of 
51each country. On the smaller scale, however, the flow of
capital caused by privateering kept the otherwise stagnating
American economy and the ship owners, builders, riggers,
sailors, and admiralty judges alive. The case of Liverpool
notwithstanding, the British economy, not subject to
blockade, would have survived merely through the use of
convoys of merchant vessels. British insurance rates rose
to 30 percent for vessels in convoy and 50 percent for those
52sailing alone by 1776, but the losses would be made good.
For the Americans, under blockade, privateering became a 
major method of bringing goods and capital into the country.
19
In this sense, it aided the Americans more than the British.
The question remains as to the significance of
privateering in the Revolution. It is estimated that 58,400
53Americans served on privateers during the war. That the
British were reluctant to include them in prisoner exchanges
and shipped them to prison hulks in England indicates the
54importance attributed to them. Privateers themselves took
16,000 prisoners and well over $12 million worth of goods 
55and shipping. Chesapeake-based privateers contributed 
their share; of the 1,697 American privateers listed in the 
Naval Records of the American Revolution, Virginia alone had 
commissioned 64 by 1783.^
All of these accomplishments were probably cancelled 
out by British privateers and the presence of the Royal 
Navy. The real progress which privateering made toward the 
American victory was in the disruption of the British line 
of supply, the economic stimulus through both outlet for 
investment and input of goods, and in showing the flag to 
the world. The British were undertaking an offensive land 
campaign over a huge continent and thousands of miles from 
home. The fact that a shipment of musket flints did not 
arrive on time may have had an impact far greater than the 
value of the cargo in dollars and cents. That France and 
Spain could clearly see the little ships harassing the 
British everywhere may have played a role equal to the 
victory at Saratoga in convincing them of the Americans' 
will to go the distance.
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CHAPTER II 
THE REGULATION OF PRIVATEERING
The legislation and jurisprudence which governed 
privateering can be viewed in terms of the three economic 
goals of the nation-state. The first, the subordination of 
pirates to a national objective, involved the legitimization 
of privateering and its clear distinction from piracy. This 
distinction allowed the sponsoring state to offer legal 
status to those who would restrict their captures to enemy 
vessels and fulfill the requirements of the prize courts.
The advantages to the privateers of being legally recognized 
rather than hunted outlaws were balanced against the 
narrowed range of potential prizes, the necessity of 
returning the prize to a friendly port, the time and money 
required by the court to condemn the prize as legal, and the 
share of the prize claimed by the sponsoring government. In 
many cases the costs and benefits did not favor the legal 
practice and the privateers reverted to piracy. Laws were 
also modified over time according to the perceived need of 
the sponsoring country to encourage large numbers of 
privateers by reducing the governmental claim to prizes.
The first step in the legitimization of privateering 
was the assumption that the right of war is exclusive to the 
sovereign^ state and the corollary that private citizens are
24
25
under no legal obligation to weigh the justice of a war. 
Thus, the private citizen could not lawfully commit hostile 
acts, such as commerce raiding, except under the commission 
of a sovereign nation, but could do so with a safe 
conscience under such commission. Laws formalizing these 
assumptions were first passed by France, Spain, and England 
in the fifteenth century.'*'
The right to seize hostile property in self-defence
eventually became regulated through the issuance of letters
of marque and reprisal. These were originally intended for
merchants who were authorized to fit out privateers in
reprisal for specific losses to enemy vessels or debts owed
by enemy merchants. Later, the reprisal reference was
forgotten and the term "letter of marque" (or "mart") came
to be associated with armed merchantmen authorized to take
prizes they might encounter en route. Technically, letters
of marque were distinct from cruising privateers, but even
contemporaries used the term for both, as well as for the
2
actual commissions they carried.
The development of admiralty courts in England 
pre-dated the codification of privateering. The admiral as 
fleet commander had administrative and disciplinary control 
over those under his command, but until the second half of 
the fourteenth century he had no judicial authority. Port 
or marine courts administered maritime law among merchants 
and seamen. A court of admiralty first appeared between 
1340 and 1357 to deal with the many piratical acts which had
26
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been charged against English vessels by foreign merchants.
In 1357 the king-in-council refused to interfere with the
admiral's sentence in a prize case concerning captured
Portuguese property. Precedent was thus set of admiralty
jurisdiction in prize cases and of appeal from the admiralty
4court to the king m  council.
Almost from the beginning, a distinction developed
between English common law and admiralty law procedure,
which was based on foreign civil law which did not try by
jury. The Black Book of the Admiralty, a virtual handbook
of court practice, substantiates this orientation for the
admiralty's jurisdiction in cases of piracy, royal fish,
navigational obstructions, shipwreck and salvage, shipping,
mercantile and criminal cases. All of these areas had
previously been under the jurisdiction of the common law
courts. There was, understandably, a good deal of
opposition by these courts to giving up their jurisdictions,
as well as from citizens involved with the new admiralty
courts who claimed their rights under Magna Carta were being
violated. In 1371 a petition to Parliament complained of
people being forced to answer charges in an admiral's court
5without benefit of a common law jury.
In 1389 and 1391 Parliament attempted to distinguish 
more precisely between admiralty and common law 
jurisdiction. The first statute commanded that the 
admiralty not meddle in "anything done within the realm" but 
only in "a thing done upon the sea." The second provided
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that all contracts/ pleas, and quarrels rising within the 
counties (land or sea) would be dealt with by the common law 
system, and only death or mayhem upon ships at sea or at 
anchor in great rivers would be adjudicable in admiralty 
court. These attempts to restrict the admiralty courts' 
encroachment on the jurisdictions, franchises, and profits 
belonging to the king and the lower courts were largely 
ignored because of the expeditious nature of the non-jury 
admiralty courts. Admiralty law had the further advantage 
of using the process iji rem by which the plaintiff had a 
double chance of satisfaction by litigating against both the 
defendant and the vessel and cargo in question? if the 
pirate was not caught, the vessel was impounded; if he was, 
he could not divest himself of such property. In 1450
Parliament finally imposed fines on those who continued to
. . . . 7take civil suits to admiralty courts.
In 1536 Henry VIII created the office vice-admiral and
with it the jurisdiction of vice-admiralty courts.
Appointed for maritime counties, the vice-admirals of the
coast were commissaries under patents issued by the lord
high admiral. They were to check the salvaging activities
of coastal inhabitants, arrest vessels and inventory the
cargoes of ships subject to litigation, examine witnesses
and execute sentences in cases of wreck, fisheries, and
local maritime business. These offices, seen mainly as
sources of profit for their holders, became the prototypes
8
for the American colonial vice-admiralty courts.
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In practice, the vice-admiral traveled his county,
holding court at various locations as cases arose. At each
stop he would call a jury of twenty-four men from the ports
of the district. This "grand jury" made presentments to the
vice-admiral of wrecks to be salvaged in the district, of
dead men found, and of felonies committed or broken customs
regulations. A common court was also held to try civil
suits. A deputy was provided for in the vice-admiralty
instructions in case the commissioner himself was not
familiar with the law. The vice-admiral collected all
monies due the king and admiral accruing from flotsam and
jetsam, royal fish, and fines and fees taken in court.
Profits for the commissioner came from a share of fines,
fees and sale of flotsam. These were quite small and varied
considerably from year to year. The large, sure profits for
the vice-admirals came from the sale of wrecks and pirate
ships and their goods. Because of the inherent temptation,
all vice-admirals provided a bond to insure that they would
9
carry out their duties faithfully.
When Englishmen transplanted themselves in America, 
they brought provision for admiralty jurisdiction. The 
charter for the Virginia Company provided for no special 
court, but an admiral or vice-admiral was to be one of the 
chief executive officials. His duties were the protection 
of the colony from attack by sea, the visitation of every 
ship which called, and the protection of the company's 
monopoly of trade by seizure of offending vessels. The
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close relationship between privateering and the admiralty is
foretold by the case of Sir Samuel Argali, who, while
serving as both governor and admiral, took to privateering
against the Spanish under a commission from the Duke of
Savoy. Prizes taken under such foreign commission would not
be upheld in British vice-admiralty courts, but it would
serve to keep him from hanging as a pirate.1^
Under the Charter of 1632, the Lord Proprietor of
Maryland held the title of High Admiral with the authority
to convene admiralty courts in his colony.'*'1 Such a court
was approved by the Assembly in 1638, but, as in Virginia,
admiralty laws were not in general use. The county or
general courts reviewed any such cases which arose without
reference to specialized admiralty precedents or 
1 2procedures. In fact, the need for admiralty courts was so 
small that when asked by the Lords Commissioners of 
Plantations in 1671 what admiralty courts existed in 
Virginia, Governor William Berkeley replied that such courts 
were not needed because not one prize had been brought to
13the state for condemnation in the last twenty-eight years.
Such a dearth of prize cases as Virginia exhibited would
definitely have put an English vice-admiralty court out of
business. Although the 1638 Maryland law had required trial
by jury in all criminal cases in admiralty court, trial in
both civil and criminal cases in county or provincial court
14was without jury except when required by either party.
This is remarkable considering both prior and subsequent
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vehemence in both England and the colonies over the 
constitutional right to jury trial.
In 1660 a second struggle between common and civil law 
saw the parliamentarians prevail over James I. This victory 
over civil law and the autocracy it upheld meant the
restriction of admiralty jurisdiction to little other than
• P n  ^ 15 prize cases m  England.
Admiralty courts had appeared in virtually all of the
colonies by the latter half of the seventeenth century, but
they were little used. The king's brother, James, Duke of
York, was already serving as Lord High Admiral of England in
1661 when he received a special patent as Lord Admiral of
New England, Virginia, Bermuda, and Jamaica. The governor of
the latter received, in turn, the first patent from James to
establish a colonial vice-admiralty court. In Jamaica,
where piracy was the greatest problem, the court was used
mainly in cases of prize because the distinction between
privateering and piracy was particularly tenuous at this 
16time.
After 1689 all royal governors were appointed 
vice-admirals and commissioned to oversee all maritime 
matters of the crown. They were to delegate this authority
through the appointment of judges of colonial vice-admiralty
17 .courts. Authority was not exercised with any consistency,
however. Judicial powers for the most part continued to be
in the hands of the county and provincial courts.
The need for an invigorated admiralty court system on
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both sides of the Atlantic came in 1696 with the 
codification of the Acts of Trade. The enforcement of these 
acts was the main reason for an improvement in the admiralty 
system, but the increased capacity for prize adjudication 
made necessary by the privateering flourishing during the 
wars of William and Mary was an added bonus. Unfortunately, 
while Americans made great use of the admiralty system and 
reaped the benefits of the prize courts, the attempt to 
enforce stricter trade regulations through the admiralty 
courts was resented. By the Revolution it was seen as an 
extension of "a jurisdiction foreign to our 
constitution.
The 1696 Navigation Act for "Preventing Frauds, and 
Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade" was aimed at 
tightening the regulations which were being abused at the 
cost of the English government. Foreign vessels were 
restricted in their participation in colonial trade, 
English-built vessels had to be used to carry goods into or 
out of the colonies, customs officers were entitled to use 
writs of assistance to search vessels suspected of 
violations of trade regulations, and captains had to post 
bonds to insure that their papers were genuine. The act was 
contradictory in specifying the jurisdiction of courts. One 
clause stated that offenses could be reviewed in the 
admiralty where the violation occurred, while another 
explicitly required trial by jury. This would have excluded 
all admiralty courts at the time. The official
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interpretation of the act was to allow concurrent 
jurisdiction in vice-admiralty courts and common law courts 
at the choice of the plaintiff. Admiralty courts thus were 
given instance jurisdiction (which was over civil or 
commercial cases) including seamen's wages, bottomry bonds, 
charter parties, salvage of wrecks, and collision, as well 
as jurisdiction over enforcement of the Acts of Trade.
Under the new law, a special commission from the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty empowered the vice-admiralty 
courts to hear prize cases in wartime.1^
Further evidence of the overriding concern of the
British government with increasing its income by tightening
controls over the colonial trade system is found in a July
6, 1704 communication from the queen to Virginia's governor
Francis Nicholson. The letter cautions him to be careful
that prize goods not be hidden or embezzled from the crown.
Complaints of abuses of the colonial admiralty courts had
been received by the government, and the precaution of
assigning special prize officers to vessels awaiting
condemnation or sale was to be taken to prevent any portion
of the ship or its cargo from being removed. A general lack
of confidence that the officers of the courts had only the
20interests of the royal treasury at heart was implicit.
In addition to the royal droit, the tariffs applicable 
to prize goods in accordance with the new trade laws came to 
as much as half that assessed against imported foreign 
merchandise. By 1708, government charges could total 60
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21percent of a prize's value. It is no wonder that the
government worried about embezzlement at a time when
privateers' profits were being so sharply cut.
Admiralty judges were not salaried until after 1708.
They did, however, completely control the admiralty courts.
They could schedule cases for early trial or wait if they
thought their fees could be enhanced. Because high legal
fees could be an inducement to dispose of a prize illegally,
judges often made it a practice to partially remit their
fees in order to draw a larger number of prizes to their
22particular port. With this sort of competition between
admiralty courts the judges were not getting wealthy from
their benches. Many continued the private practice of law;
Peyton Randolph of Virginia was attorney general as well as
23vice-admiralty judge.
With the outbreak of Queen Anne's War in 1708, the
economic forces swung away from high fees and droits and
24toward the promotion of privateering. The "Act for the
Encouragement of Trade to America" waived the royal droit
and eased regulation of privateering by empowering colonial
governors to issue letters of marque, and specifically
giving prize jurisdiction to colonial vice-admiralty 
25courts. The appeal process was modified so that a select 
group of privy councilors, the Lords Commissioners for Prize 
Appeals, was created to render final decision, rather than 
the king-in-council or the High Court of the Admiralty, as 
had been the practice. The statute also outlined trial
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procedures for use in prize cases which differed from other
cases - a realization of the difficulty of finding lawyers
(not to mention judges) with any experience in such a
2 6peculiar area of the law.
By the beginning of King William's War the regulations
of 1708 had lapsed, and new legislation continued to waive
27the royal droit. In addition, the crown, wishing to
tighten control over the smaller privateers who more easily
avoided regulation, voided the commissions of all raiders of
less than 100 tons or carrying fewer than ten three-pound
guns or fewer than forty crewmen. The first salary for
judges was instituted at £200 per year in peacetime, to be
paid from the royal droit on salvage or the sale of old 
2 8naval stores. High costs of administration of admiralty
justice were cited when the officers of the Virginia court
were reminded in 1715 to comply with the new law and not
29exact a fee of more than £10 from each prize condemned.
Excepting minor changes, the colonial vice-admiralty 
administration remained in the same form through 1763. At 
that time there were eleven courts in North America, the 
same number as at the turn of the century. Vice-admiralty 
courts were located in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, and North and South 
Carolina. The courts could convene wherever the judge 
pleased, and deputies were often appointed (and paid with a 
percentage of the judge's fees) to take the courts to
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isolated areas. Besides the judges (who were political 
appointees of the governor), the officers of the court 
consisted of the registers, who were the court clerks and 
kept records and issued citations and orders, and the 
marshals, who served processes and took custody of goods or 
people and executed decrees. Marshals and registers were 
also appointed by the governors, except in Maryland and 
North Carolina, where the judges appointed them themselves. 
By the end of the Seven Years' War virtually all colonial 
vice-admiralty court officers, including judges, were 
provincial-born.^
The jurisdiction of the courts was threefold. Their 
original function in England was to settle disagreements 
over seamen's wages and problems between merchants and 
seamen or officers and crew. These, along with cases of 
shipwreck and salvage, charters, bottomry, and collisions at 
sea, remained the most numerous in the colonial courts. The 
second area of jurisdiction was added by the 1696 navigation 
laws and involved the enforcement of earlier laws and the 
prosecution of offenders. About one-third of all colonial
vice-admiralty court cases from 170 2 to 1763 were prize
• 4. • -p 31cases in time of war.
A prize case was initiated by the party making the 
capture, who filed a declaration or "libel" (indictment) 
with the court against the prize vessel, which included a 
stylized "complaint" and a prayer to the court for relief. 
The judge then ordered the marshal of the court to take
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custody of the vessel and/or cargo and to give public notice 
of this action. This usually meant a short advertisement in 
the local newspaper. A proclamation stating the complaint 
was issued by the judge and repeated at the following 
session of the court. At the second reading of the 
proclamation the claimant or respondent filed his answer to 
the libel. He was allowed three sessions to appear and 
answer. If the respondent did not answer the libel, a 
decree or judgement by default was issued. If answer was 
filed, the issue was joined and a trial proceeded. Both 
parties were required to stipulate securities (bonds) that 
they would appear for trial. The opposing proctors 
(lawyers) examined witnesses outside of court, testimony was 
taken in writing in the form of answers to interrogation and 
cross-interrogation. At a further session of the court the 
proctors presented the witnesses' statements and recited 
their arguments. If more than one claim against the vessel 
was pending or if any prior liens applied the court heard 
them at this time. The most important aspect of this 
discovery phase, in terms of the court's determination of 
fact, was the yielding of the prize's papers stating the 
country of registry and the origin and destination of the 
goods carried. The judge delivered his decree based upon 
this evidence, and the marshal then executed it. The judge 
could issue an interlocutory decree postponing his final
32judgement until a later time, pending further disclosure.
Prize appeals usually went to the Lords Commissioners
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for Prize Appeals. Instance appeals (cases from the first
category of admiralty jurisdiction) went to the Privy
Council, but navigation act cases could go to either the
High Court of Admiralty or to the Privy Council. Decrees
from the High Court of Admiralty could be carried on further
appeal to the Lords Commissioners, but a decision by the
3 3king in (Privy) council was final. Needless to say, 
colonial judges were often confused as to where to send a 
particular appeal.
The provincial judge executed the provisions of the 
appeal decision, whatever body issued it. If a libel was 
successfully prosecuted, appraisers evaluated the vessel 
and/or goods and the marshal sold them at public auction.
Any failure to meet a judgement (usually in a non-prize 
case) meant fine, attachment, or imprisonment.^^
Over the half-century of colonial vice-admiralty court 
jurisdiction, certain differences developed between the way 
the law was perceived and enforced in England and in the 
colonies. These discrepancies arose as much out of the 
conditions acting upon the courts and what they were 
expected to accomplish as from the fact that American 
barristers and judges had much less experience than their 
English counterparts in the subleties of maritime law. In 
the American experience, the admiralty courts had been given 
steadily increasing power since 1696. American 
jurisprudence had also not benefitted from the power 
struggle between the common law and the civil courts, which
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had resulted in the restriction in authority of the latter 
in England.
The primacy of the common law was upheld in England by
the use of the writ of prohibition, issued by the common law
court to stop proceedings in the civil admiralty court.
Colonial common law courts assumed this power over the
vice-admiralty courts but did not exercise it to the same
extent, resulting in its de facto abrogation. Royal customs
officials, realizing that American juries were reluctant to
condemn the property of their neighbors under what were seen
as onerous trade laws, began to exercise the clause in the
Navigation Act of 1696 granting the equal jurisdiction of
admiralty and common law courts in trade and revenue cases.
The choice of a non-jury court at the discretion of the
plaintiff allowed better enforcement of trade regulation,
but also increased American resentment of such taxation
35without the representation of a jury of one's peers.
In addition to the legislative increase in admiralty
court power, practical factors tended to increase the use of
such courts at the expense of the common law. The relative
speed of admiralty proceedings (a common law court could
take up to six months to condemn a seizure), and the
advantages of the process i-n rem more than compensated for
the high cost of admiralty justice in all but the least
valuable cases where the percentage of fees charges was 
3 6prohibitive. After the high percentage fees were repealed 
during King William's War, admiralty court costs were
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normally 2.5-3.5 percent of the prize value. Additional
legal costs realized in the form of attorneys fees ran 1.5-2
percent. The high number of captures declared unlawful, and
the resulting appeals were the major factors cutting into
3 7privateering profits. During King George's War
(1739-1748) the cost of admiralty justice was about 15
percent of the total value of all prizes taken. For the
3 8Seven Years' War the figure dropped to 10 percent.
Because the judge's fee was set by law, he had an interest 
in keeping total costs in his court low and in the timely 
disposal of cases in order that his might be seen as a 
favorable court to a privateer with a choice of ports to 
which prizes could be sent. The judge could thus increase 
his fees through volume.
Legislation, rigid enforcement of the navigation acts, 
the advantages of quick proceedings and the in rem process, 
and the falling costs of admiralty courts all contributed to 
a greater concentration of power in the colonial 
vice-admiralty courts than in the English admiralty court 
system. The resulting abridgement of rights under the 
common law as perceived by the Americans was not apparent to 
the British who lived under the same laws and suffered no 
such loss.
In fact, differences in procedural law in the colonial 
courts served to increase American ambivalence. Because 
American lawyers and judges were virtually all 
provincial-born and had no experience in English admiralty
40
court procedure, certain practices evolved which had no
basis in the English system but which appeared when appeals
were carried to the high courts. First, colonial courts
routinely admitted evidence of a questionable nature. The
use of interrogatories which were prepared by the captors or
taken from persons not even aboard the vessel in question,
as well as the submission as evidence of papers not found on
the prize at the time of capture were fairly common
practices. While there were no clear rules of evidence to
aid the judge in determining the facts in the face of
contradicting testimony or possible forgeries of ships
papers, American courts were less likely to declare a prize
illegal based on the questionable conduct or even obvious
forgeries of the captors. In general, colonial
vice-admiralty courts used a system loosely based on a
combination of admiralty instance (non-prize) procedure and
3 9common law m  deciding prize cases.
English courts clearly separated instance and prize
jurisdiction as set forth in the prize acts (specific laws
for their procedure enacted in 1708 and amended thereafter).
Prize jurisdiction was seen as specially granted in time of
war, with procedures which were entirely under control of
Parliament. American judges and lawyers did not comprehend
the distinction; the same procedures were followed as in any
40other vice-admiralty case. The nature of this different 
attitude to prize jurisdiction imparted a sense of 
independence, of irresponsibility, to elected authority in
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the vice-admiralty courts which added fuel to American
dissatisfaction with British rule.
British attempts at rebuilding the treasury through
various trade acts at the end of the Seven Years War were
accompanied by modifications in the vice-admiralty system
aimed at increasing the efficiency of customs collection.
In 1764 the earl of Northumberland was created "Vice Admiral
over All America." William Spry was appointed judge of a
court convened in Halifax and was given jurisdiction over
all America. This is somewhat confusing because the court
was co-equal in jurisdiction with the provincial courts and
had no appellate jurisdiction. Spry's annual salary of £800
paid from fees from condemned seizures was protested by
colonial merchants, who argued that he would always condemn
seizures as legal prizes in order to insure his wages.
Provision was made for the payment of Spry's salary out of
admiralty reserves if his condemnations were insufficient.
Moreover, provincial vice-admiralty judges had always
depended on their own actions in condemnations as the only
source of their income. The new court at least made an
attempt to remove any conflict of interest. Colonial
protests really stemmed from the fact that the new court was
created in order to try the unpopular new trade laws, which
in England were tried in common-law Exchequer courts with 
41juries.
In 1768 the Halifax court was deemed too remote from 
most of the colonies and was replaced by district courts in
42
Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, and a new one in Halifax, 
each with a regional jurisdiction. These courts were also 
to supplement the provincial courts, but were also given
appellate power over them. The judges' salaries were £600
42 . . .per year. This was the last major modification of the
colonial vice-admiralty system before the Revolution.
The irony of the American experience with the
vice-admiralty courts was that the colonists needed them and
used them to their great advantage in trying prize cases, at
the same time they were decrying them as unconstitutional
and tyrannical. The Americans had four main objections to
the courts. The judges' salaries were seen to be exorbitant
and the method of payment conducive to conflict of interest.
For the most part, however, the vice-admiralty judges were
men of integrity, and salaries were fixed to end economic
temptations. Colonists were concerned that many judges
received their appointments as reward for loyalty during the
Stamp Act crisis. This was, on the whole, a reaction to the
legislation, for the judges proved competent and tended to
stay above the conflict. The British were accused of
extending the jurisdiction of the courts beyond traditional
limits in enforcing imperial trade and navigation laws.
While it is true that trade laws such as the Revenue Act of
1764 and the Townshend Acts allowed prosecution in
vice-admiralty courts, the most onerous Stamp Act did not.
The heart of the dispute was the alleged denial of the right
of trial by jury. Non-jury vice-admiralty courts never had
43
sole jurisdiction under the law. However, when colonial
trade officials realized that juries would not bring in
verdicts against their neighbors, the vice-admiralty courts
43had sole jurisdiction m  practice.
Before the Continental Congress declared independence
from England, the international legal implications of
fitting out privateers was weighed. Because the granting of
commissions was the preserve of a sovereign state, such an
act could be construed as one of independence. Those in the
Congress who were not yet ready to take that step toward a
44complete break opposed privateering commissions. By the
fall of 17 75, however, Washington had warships which were
capturing prizes. He wrote to Congress urging the
establishment of admiralty courts to dispose of these 
45seizures. Congress ordered research on the subject and 
the first report on privateering was placed before the body 
on November 25, 1775. This paper advocated a halfway 
measure of legalizing the capture of warships, troop 
transports, and vessels carrying arms and ammunition, and 
recommended that the individual colonies set up prize
4. 4 6courts.
In December 1775 Virginia commissioned John Blair,
James Holt, and Edmund Randolph as judges of prize cases.
At least two of the three could convene a court with 
jurisdiction over "all matters relating to vessels and their 
cargoes." Provision was made for fining witnesses who did 
not appear fifty shillings. Appeals were to be heard by the
44
state committee of safety upon receipt of a bond of £20
securing the due prosecution of the appeal within thirty
days. The judges' salaries were set at twenty-five
47shillings per day while the court was in session.
After the British "Prohibitory Act" forbade all trade
with the colonies, Congress passed a much stronger resolve
on March 23, 1776, which declared all British vessels fair 
48game. The British, realizing that any acceptance of the
legality of American privateers meant recognition of the
rights of Congress as government of a sovereign nation,
referred to them as pirates and shipped their prisoners to
49England to be tried as such.
Congress left the issuing of commissions to the
individual colonies, but printed up blank commission forms
with the names of the owners, commander, vessel, type,
50tonnage, number of guns, and crew to be filled in. On
April 3, 1776 Congress issued its "Instructions to the
Commanders of private Ships or Vessels of War," which was
intended, given the British propaganda, to draw as great a
distinction as possible between American privateers and
piracy for the world at large. Paragraph IV stipulated that
all legal interrogatories and documents be delivered to the
proper court. Paragraph V insured that a captured vessel be
kept intact until condemnation, while paragraph VI
prohibited torture of prisoners, and paragraph IX insured
against the piratical practice of the ransoming of prisoners
51at sea (thus avoiding taking any vessels to court).
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Later, American privateers were required to pay the captured
crew's normal wages out of the prize money distribution, and
commanders were made liable to the owners of captured
vessels in case of damages incurred during seizures not
5 2upheld m  court. A $5,000 bond was required by all
privateers up to 100 tons burthen, $10,000 if larger, to
insure compliance with these regulations. In May 1780 the
5 3bond was increased to $20,000.
Congress also left the administration of admiralty 
justice to the individual colonies. In reaction to the 
vice-admiralty courts' violation of the right to jury trial, 
however, Congress instructed each colony to institute jury 
trials in prize proceedings. In May 1776 the Virginia 
assembly upheld Congress' April 3rd resolution by appointing 
a new admiralty court, requiring trial by a jury of 
freeholders. James Hubard, Joseph Prentis, and John Tyler
were appointed judges. Again, any two could convene a
. 54court.
In the April 3rd resolution, Congress decreed that it
would hear all appeals in general session. The first of
these appeals was heard on August 5, 1776, and was so
complex and time-consuming that Congress referred the matter
to special committee. A standing committee for appeals was
55established the next year.
In October 1776 Virginia enacted Thomas Jefferson's 
"Act for establishing a Court of Admiralty." This third 
version kept to the three-judge format, but they were now to
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be chosen by joint ballot of both houses of the assembly. 
This court was to be governed by "the regulations of the 
Continental Congress, the acts of the Virginia general 
assembly, English statutes prior to the fourth year of the 
reign of James I, and the laws of Oleron, and the Rhodian 
and Imperial laws so far as they have been observed in the 
English courts of admiralty."
The judges were to appoint an advocate for the state, a 
register, and a marshal. Court procedure called for a libel 
to be filed, and if the owner of the prize vessel could not 
be found, an advertisement was to be published in the 
Virginia Gazette for three weeks. If no owner appeared (it 
was not likely that any British merchant ship owners would), 
the libel was accepted as confessed and the court condemned 
the vessel. A decree of the court's findings was also 
published in the Gazette for three weeks, but if the prize's 
owner appeared within one year his defense would still be 
heard. The Virginia law allowed for the fees of the 
register and marshal to be set by the court. If the 
libellant desired, the marshal was authorized to order the 
sale of the condemned vessel at auction. Congressional 
jurisdiction of appeal was also upheld.
All matters of fact were tried by jury, except in cases 
of capture from an enemy, which were tried by the court or 
jury as Congress directed. The distinction thus finally 
began to be made in an American admiralty court between 
instance and prize practice. The rights of the individual
47
in non-prize cases were protected by jury trial, but British
56prizes were not automatically afforded the same safeguard.
Prize law was so complex and the facts often so unclear
that the jury trial system proved disastrous in the few
months following its inception in May 1776. Local juries
were commonly overruled by the appeals committee because
5 7they had no knowledge of sea law or custom. The October
court was only a partial remedy, for in May 1779 the law was
again changed to call for jury trial only when both parties
5 8were citizens of Virginia.
The problem of keeping soldiers and sailors in the
service of the Continental and Virginia army and navy was
approached in two ways. On February 6, 1777 Virginia
conformed to the regulations of Congress in reducing its
droit in the capture of English merchant vessels by naval
ships to one-half of their value. The entire value of
captured British warships went to the the crew of the
captor. This provided some incentive for the regular navy
seamen, since it was comparable to the privateers whose
5 8crews received the whole value of any prize taken. In
October of the same year Virginia state naval crews also
59received the whole value of any prize taken. In May 1780
Virginia dealt with the problem of army deserters by 
witholding prize money and a £500 fine from any privateer 
with deserters in its crew.^
As seen in the retreat from the use of juries, 
instructions from the Congress were not always carried out
48
by the states. In May 1781 Virginia authorized the Congress 
to levy a duty of 5 percent on certain goods including prize 
goods and prizes. By November Virginia legislators realized 
that several other states had not enacted the law and 
decided to suspend it pending such enactment. In 1782 
letters of complaint were sent to the governors of 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland which cited the 
growing public debt and asked why they did not comply with 
the law. Apparently, no answer was received; Virginia
finally repealed the law, claiming that it was injurious to
4-4-  ^ 61 state sovereignty.
A Pennsylvania admiralty court judge, George Ross, 
proved particularly recalcitrant in dealing with the 
Continental Congress. A complex case came before him in 
1777 in which he awarded a one-fourth share in a prize to 
captain Gideon Olmsted and his crew of the sloop Active (who 
actually captured the vessel) and three-fourths to two ships 
who were in sight at the time. This was common in admiralty 
practice at the time because the ships not actually engaged 
would still presumably weigh in the decision of the captain 
of the prize to surrender. Olmsted appealed his case to 
Congress, however, and was awarded the whole value of the 
prize in December 1778. Judge Ross refused to distribute 
the prize money, stating "Congress had no right to try a
6 2case settled by the court of admiralty of Pennsylvania."
A thirty-year battle began involving states rights and the 
creation of the first federal court in 1779. Congress
49
provided for a three judge court of appeals, the first such
federal court, to hear such complex, inter-state cases and
64those not satisfied by the state courts' decisions. The
system proved quite satisfactory for of the thousands of
admiralty cases heard in the state courts, only 114 were 
65appealed. By the end of this court's life m  1786 
federalism was more secure, but Olmsted did not receive his 
prize money until 1809.^
CONCLUSION
By the eighteenth century, the period when privateers 
from the Chesapeake Bay region were becoming active, the 
great age of privateering was long past. Hawkins and Drake 
had plundered the Spanish Main in the 1560s and 1570s, and 
Henry Morgan capped his career with the sack of Panama in 
1671. Chesapeake privateers could hold no hope of being 
made admiral of the fleet, or of retiring in knighthood to a 
Jamaican plantation. Military and naval forces operating in 
the Chesapeake privateers 1 waters had become too strong to 
allow for the bold successes of earlier times. Improved 
laws and regulations governing the "letters of marque" 
restricted adventuring for personal profit.
Some of the conditions which made the earlier Caribbean 
privateering so profitable were still prevalent in the 
eighteenth century, however. Colonial settlements were 
still distant from the mother countries, requiring large 
shipments of goods over long sea routes. Sail-powered naval 
forces, while able to make life much more difficult for 
privateers, were as yet too slow and thinly distributed to 
protect all commercial shipping. The growing wealth of the 
colonies increased the value of the prizes, and continuing 
conflicts provided the opportunity to be legally 
commissioned to attack the enemy's shipping.
50
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As before, merchant seaman traded their relatively safe 
positions for the promise of many times their normal pay 
during a voyage, while poor landsmen suffering increased 
hardships during the frequent wars flocked to the 
privateers. The permanence and scope of the social changes 
brought about by this exodus have yet to be studied.
The opportunity for these men to share in the prize 
wealth depended upon the owners and financiers of the 
privateer vessels, and with the latter group's motivation 
lies the great difference in the two eras of privateering. 
Chesapeake privateer owners were almost invariably merchants 
who were put out of business by naval blockade or enemy 
privateers. This defensive response to adverse economic 
conditions was not exhibited by the earlier generations who 
were basically opportunists and adventurers. While the 
earlier privateers brought great wealth to their patrons, 
especially in the Elizabethan era, the smaller returns of 
the Chesapeake privateers were more crucial to the survival 
of that region's fragile, isolated economy.
On the surface, the regulation of privateering and 
prize courts in America seems firmly grounded in the English 
legislation, precedent, and custom which had been evolving 
before Drake's time. The unique conditions and requirements 
of admiralty jurisdiction in America, however, produced a 
system quite different from that in England. The fact that 
neither colony nor mother country recognized the differences 
accounted for much of the tension derived from the
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Americans' perceptions of the abuse of their rights.
Attempts to avoid the abuses seen as inherent in the English 
admiralty system through the grafting of common law jury 
trial onto admiralty courts proved abortive. Largely 
because of the privateers' need for prize courts and 
specialized admiralty laws and procedures, Americans found 
themselves ultimately instituting the type of system which 
they had so vehemently fought as a tyrannical extension of 
imperial power.
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